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INTRODUCTION
Kendall filed this appeal to challenge the constitutionality of Utah Code § 78B-3104 (the “bond statute”) and Utah Code § 63G-7-601 (the “undertaking statute”), which
require the filing of a bond and an undertaking when bringing an action against a police
officer or a government entity. The issues were fully briefed by the parties in their briefs
to the Court of Appeals, including the fact that this appeal is moot and that Kendall does
not have standing to challenge the statutes. The recall of this case by the Supreme Court
has not remedied these deficiencies and the Court should dismiss the appeal. To the extent
the Court does consider the merits of this appeal, this Court should be guided by its prior
decisions in Zamora v. Draper, 635 P.2d 78 (Utah 1981) and Snyder v. Cook, 688 P.2d 496
(Utah 1984) that find the bond statute Kendall challenges in this action is constitutional on
its face. The conclusion this Court reached in Zamora and Snyder that the bond statute is
constitutional as applied in usual and ordinary circumstances is correct. The bond statute
does not violate the open courts provision because it does not abrogate or impermissibly
restrict access to the courts. Likewise, the bond statute does not violate due process
because it is reasonably related to a proper legislative purpose and it satisfies the notice
and hearing requirements of a procedural due process analysis. Kendall has not shown
otherwise.
Similarly, Kendall has not shown that the Court’s decisions in Zamora and Snyder
are no longer sound because of changing conditions. The bond statute was passed in
recognition of the unique role of police officers in our society and the reality that this role
exposes them to a greater risk of frivolous lawsuits. This unique role of a police officer
1

has not changed since this statute was first passed and there is nothing to indicate that
officers are subject to fewer frivolous actions now than they were seventy years ago. The
bond and undertaking statues do not violate constitutional rights and this Court should not
depart from the conclusion it reached in Zamora and Snyder that the bond statute does not
violate constitutional rights on its face.
ARGUMENT
I.

THIS APPEAL IS MOOT AND KENDALL LACKS STANDING TO
CHALLENGE THE STATUTES AT ISSUE.
The recall of this case by the Supreme Court does not create a “material difference”

in the arguments presented to the Court. This Court’s Order on Supplemental Briefing
states a supplemental brief should only be submitted “if the posture before the Supreme
Court creates a material difference in the argument presented . . ..’” As discussed at length
in the City Defendants’1 Appellee Brief, the Court should decline to rule on the merits of
this appeal because the issues raised are moot. See Appellee Br. at 12-14. Kendall also
does not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statutes. The Supreme
Court’s recall of this case does not remedy these deficiencies and the appeal should be
dismissed.
II.

THE PRINCIPLES OF STARE DECISIS SHOW THE HOLDING IN
ZAMORA SHOULD BE FOLLOWED.
To the extent the Court elects to consider the merits of this appeal, the Court should

1

Defendants/Appellees Brett Olsen, Brian Purvis, Joseph Allen Everett, Tom
Edmundson, George Pregman, and Salt Lake City Corporation are referred to collectively
as the City Defendants.
2

not depart from the conclusion it reached in its prior decisions that the bond statute does
not violate constitutional rights on its face. “Stare decisis is ‘a cornerstone of AngloAmerican jurisprudence.’” Bank of Am. v. Adamson, 2017 UT 2, ¶¶ 9-10, No. 20140861,
2017 WL 117356, at * 2 (Utah 2017)(quoting State v. Guard, 2015 UT 96, ¶ 33, 371 P.3d
1). “Any party asking a court to overturn prior precedent has a substantial burden of
persuasion.” ASC Utah, Inc. v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C., 2010 UT 65, ¶ 23, 245 P.3d
184 (quotation marks omitted). Thus, “[a] court will follow the rule of law which it has
established in earlier cases, unless clearly convinced that the rule was originally erroneous
or is no longer sound because of changing conditions and that more good than harm will
come by departing from precedent.” Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted).
In Zamora this Court concluded the bond statute is constitutional as applied in usual
and ordinary circumstances. It recognized that the statute could operate to restrict access
to the courts if applied to an individual that is impecunious, but found the statute
constitutional because the language of the statute permits district courts flexibility in setting
the amount of the bond to ensure individuals that are impecunious are not denied access to
the courts. The Court affirmed its holding in Synder. The conclusion the Court reached is
correct and Kendall has not shown that changing conditions warrant a departure from that
conclusion.
A.

The Conclusion the Court Reached in Zamora is Correct.
1.

Zamora was Correctly Decided because the Statute does not Abrogate
a Legal Remedy.

The conclusion the Court reached in Zamora is correct because the bond statute does

3

not eliminate a legal remedy. A necessary pre-requisite to every open courts challenge is
that the statute at issue abrogate a legal remedy. See e.g., Tindley, et al. v. Salt Lake City
Sch. Dist., 2005 UT 30, ¶ 12-26, 116 P.3d 295.2 A statute abrogates a legal remedy if it
“annul[s], cancel[s], repeal[s] or destroy[s]” a right to recovery. Burgandy v. State Dep’t
of Human Serv., 1999 UT App 208, ¶ 16, 983 P.2d 586 (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 8
(5th ed.1979), for its definition of “abrogate” and finding statute at issue did not violate
open courts provision because it did not abrogate a claim). If no claim is abrogated, no
violation of the open courts provision can be shown. Tindley, 2005 UT 30, ¶ 12-26 (finding
statute did not violate open courts provision because it did not abrogate a claim). The bond
statute at issue in Zamora and this case is an attorney’s fees provision that imposes a bond
requirement to ensure collection of fees and costs, if awarded. It does not eliminate a legal
remedy and, thus, does not violate the open courts provision.3
This conclusion is consistent with other decisions of this Court that find similar
statutes do not violate the open courts provision on their face. For example, in Jensen v.
State Tax Comm’n, 835 P.2d 965, 969 (Utah 1992), this Court considered a challenge to a
statute that required taxpayers to deposit the full amount of assessed taxes, penalties, and

2

See also, Wood v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 2002 UT 134, ¶ 15, 67 P.3d 436 (stating
“the Berry test begins with the presumption that a legal remedy was abolished”).
3
The fact Zamora was decided before the landmark decision in Berry, which sets
forth the two-part test used to determine if a statute that abrogates a claim survives
constitutional muster does not affect the correctness of the Court’s conclusion. Courts only
engage in a Berry analysis if the statute abrogates a claim. Burgandy v. State Dep’t of
Human Serv., 1999 UT App 208, ¶ 16, 983 P.2d 586 (stating Berry established a two-part
test for analyzing open courts questions, but the “test applies only when a right is
abrogated”); Wood, 2002 UT 134, ¶ 15(stating “the Berry test begins with the presumption
that a legal remedy was abolished”).
4

interest with the Tax Commission before seeking appellate review. The Court found that
the statute was constitutional on its face, but it could operate to bar access to courts as
applied to the facts of a particular case. Id. In that case, the appellants had failed to deposit
the $340,000 they were deemed to owe in taxes, penalties and past due interest before
bringing their appeal challenging that determination. Id. at 968-69. The Court excused the
appellants from compliance with the statutory deposit requirement because the appellants
did not have the funds and it would have been unconstitutional to impose the deposit
requirement in that case. Id. at 969. However, the Court made clear that the statute was
not unconstitutional on its face and that if a taxpayer could meet the deposit requirement,
they were required to do so. Id. (stating “the statutory requirement is not unconstitutional
in all cases. When a taxpayer is able to meet the requirement, the deposit must be paid”).
Like the Court in Jensen, the Court in Zamora found the bond statute constitutional
on its face, but that it could operate to prevent access to the courts if applied to an individual
that was unable to afford the bond. Zamora, 635 P.2d at 80. The Court found that this
concern is resolved by the fact that courts have the ability to conduct preliminary
procedures to determine whether a plaintiff is impecunious and able to afford the bond and
the language of the statute contemplates such flexibility. Id. at 80-81. The Court’s
conclusion is consistent with several cannons of statutory construction. For example,
statutes should be read in harmony and not in conflict with other relevant statutory
provisions.4 In Zamora, the Court read the language of the bond statute in conjunction

4

Foutz v. City of S. Jordan, 2004 UT 75, ¶ 11, 100 P.3d 1171 (“We read the plain
language of the statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions in harmony with other
5

with other statutory provisions that give courts the ability to hold preliminary procedures
to determine if a plaintiff is impecunious and can afford a statutorily imposed fee. Id. at
80-82.

The Court’s conclusion is also consistent with the principles of statutory

construction that direct courts to interpret statutes to avoid absurd results5 and to presume
statutes are constitutional and to resolve any doubts in favor of constitutionality.6
Finally, the Court may disregard the claim that the bond statute is unconstitutional
on its face because it discourages people that are not impecunious from bringing claims

statutes in the same chapter and related chapters.”); Anderson v. Bell, 2010 UT 47, ¶ 9, 234
P.3d 1147, 1150 (“[O]ur plain language analysis is not so limited that we only inquire into
individual words and subsections in isolation; our interpretation of a statute requires that
each part or section be construed in connection with every other part or section so as to
produce a harmonious whole. Moreover, the purpose of the statute has an influence on the
plain meaning of a statute.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
5
State ex rel. Z.C., 2007 UT 54, ¶ 11, 165 P.3d 1206 (stating a “well-settled caveat
to the plain meaning rule states that a court should not follow the literal language of a
statute if its plain meaning works an absurd result”) (citations and quotation marks
omitted); Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P’ship, 2011 UT 50, ¶ 70 n.23, 267 P.3d 863,
879 n.23 (“When statutory language . . . presents the court with two alternative readings,
we prefer the reading that avoids absurd results.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
6
Tindley, 2005 UT 30, ¶ 11 (stating “the challenged statute is presumed
constitutional, and we resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality”); State
v. Angilau, 2011 UT 3, ¶ 7, 245 P.3d 745 (stating the Court is “guided by the well-settled
proposition that all statutes are presumed to be constitutional and the party challenging a
statute bears the burden of proving its invalidity”).
Kendall’s contention that this principle of statutory construction does not apply
when a party challenges a statute under the open courts provision is incorrect. The
authority Kendall relies on has been superseded by more recent majority decisions of this
Court. See e.g., Tindley., 2005 UT 30, ¶ 11(stating in the context of an open courts
challenge that the statute “is presumed constitutional, and we resolve any reasonable doubts
in favor of constitutionality”); Judd v. Drezga, 2004 UT 91, ¶ 11, 103 P.3d 135 (where the
majority recognized “an obligation of deference to legislative judgments in a Berry review”
and stated that “to the extent this differs from our prior application of Berry, those prior
applications are disavowed”); Id. ¶ 42 (C.J. Durham dissenting) (noting the majority
afforded a presumption of validity to the statute in considering the appellant’s open courts
challenge, disavowing the holding in Wood that Kendall relies on).
6

because of the financial risks involved.7 This does not show an elimination of a legal
remedy.

There are financial risks and obligations associated with engaging in any

litigation, including costs of discovery, expert fees, and payment of an attorney to pursue
the claim. In some cases these financial risks and obligations also include a statutory or
contractual award of attorney fees to the prevailing party8 and in all cases they include an
award of costs to the prevailing party.9 Whenever a person decides to pursue a legal claim
they necessarily assume these financial obligations. The fact that pursuing litigation
necessarily requires the expenditure of funds and the risk of an adverse judgment does not

7

See Kendall’s Suppl. Br., at 6-7 & 10.
See e.g., Utah Code § 63G-20-204 (awarding attorney’s fees to prevailing party
in an action brought against government entity relating to the provisions of the Religious
Protections in Relation to Marriage, Family, or Sexuality Act); Utah Code § 11-39-106
(awarding attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party in an action brought against a local entity
to enforce the provision of the Act on Building Improvements and Public Works Projects);
Utah Code § 78B-5-826 (awarding costs and attorneys’ fees to prevailing party when the
provisions of a promissory note, written contract, or other writing allow at least one party
to recover attorneys’ fees); Utah Code § 78b-11-126 (awarding attorneys’ fees to the
prevailing party in an action brought under Utah Uniform Arbitration Act); Utah Code §
30-3-3 (stating “court may order a party to pay the costs, attorney fees, and witness fees,
including expert witness fees, of the other party to enable the other party to prosecute or
defend the action” in actions to establish an order of custody, parent-time, child support,
alimony, or division of property in a domestic case); Utah Code § 57-16-8 (awarding
attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party in eviction proceedings brought under the Mobile
Home Park Residency Act); 28 U.S.C. § 1988 (permitting award of attorneys’ fees to the
prevailing party in an action brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983); Thorpe v. Ancell, 367
F. App’x 914, 924 (10th Cir. 2010) (affirming the lower court’s award of attorneys’ fees
to police officers in § 1983 case); United States v. Hyundai Merch. Marine Co., 172 F.3d
1187, 1192 (9th Cir. 1999) (applying the Oil Pollution Act to permit the government to
recover attorneys’ fees); United States v. Chapman, 146 F.3d 1166, 1175 (9th Cir. 1998)
(interpreting CERCLA to permit the government, as the prevailing party, to recover
attorneys’ fees).
9
UTAH RULE CIV. P. 54(d)(1) (awarding costs other than attorney’s fees to
prevailing party, unless a rule or statute specifically provides otherwise); FED. R. CIV. P.
54(d)(1) (awarding costs to the prevailing party on the same grounds as the state rule)
8

7

show an abrogation of a legal remedy.10 Kendall has not shown the Court’s holding in
Zamora was clearly erroneous11 and the Court should not depart from the conclusion it
reached in that case that the bond statute is constitutional and does not violate the open
courts clause on its face.
2.

Zamora was Correctly Decided because the Bond Statute does not
Violate Due Process.

Kendall argues Zamora was incorrectly decided because it does not discuss whether
the statute violates due process. This argument is not compelling. The Zamora decision
does not contain any specific discussion of whether the bond statute violates due process
because the plaintiff did not challenge the statute on those grounds.12 But this does not
show that the conclusion the Court reached in Zamora is wrong. As set forth at length in
the City Defendants’ Appellee Brief, neither the bond nor the undertaking statute violate

10

Kendall’s citation to choice quotes from fact witnesses he called at an evidentiary
hearing set to determine if he was impecunious and required to pay a bond does not show
the bond or undertaking statutes abrogate a claim. See Kendall’s Suppl. Br., at 6, n.6.
Whether a statute abrogates a claim is a question of law. See, e.g., Tindley, 2005 UT 30,
¶¶12-26; Wood, 2002 UT 134, ¶¶ 9-15. It is the role of this Court, not fact witnesses at an
evidentiary hearing, to resolve that question.
11
Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2407 (2014) (citing
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (“Before overturning a long-settled
precedent, however, we require ‘special justification,’ not just an argument that the
precedent was wrongly decided.”); Bank of Am, 2017 WL 117356, at *2-3 (declining to
depart from prior precedent where plaintiff did not mention the applicable standard, and
failed to offer an arguments to explain why the Court’s decision was either originally
erroneous or no longer sound); ASC Utah, 2010 UT 65, ¶ 24 (recognizing the plaintiff was
not alleging the Court’s decision was “no longer sound because of changing conditions,
but “simply that the rule was originally wrong and should be abandoned” and finding the
plaintiff did not satisfy his burden of persuasion).
12
Notably, the decision in Zamora is instructive to the due process analysis because
it identifies the purpose of the bond statute and shows that it is rationally related to a
legitimate legislative purpose.
8

due process because the statutes are reasonably related to a proper legislative purpose13 and
they satisfy the notice and hearing requirements of a procedural due process analysis.
Rather than repeat arguments on issues that have been fully briefed, the City Defendants
refer the Court to their Appellee Brief for further discussion on this point.
B.

Kendall has not Shown Changing Conditions Warrant a Departure
from this Court’s Holding in Zamora.

Kendall has not shown that this Court’s holding in Zamora that the bond statute is
constitutional is no longer sound because of changing conditions. The bond statute was
first passed in 1951. See 1951 Ch. 58, § 1, enacting Utah Code § 104-11-16 (1951) (first
version of the bond statute). As set forth in Zamora, the statute was passed in recognition
of the unique role of police officers in our society and the reality that this role exposes them
to a greater risk of frivolous lawsuits:
[P]eace officers are in an especially hazardous calling rendering a service
essential to public safety and welfare. While it is the privilege of most of us
to steer clear of situations where there is violence and danger, it is the sworn
duty of peace officers to go into such situations. Without extenuating thereon,
this exposes them to the possibility of becoming involved therein and of
incurring animosities of those engaged in such troubles, with the consequent
risks of lawsuits which may emanate therefrom.
Because of what has just been said, we see nothing inherently unreasonable
13

Kendall argues heightened scrutiny applies to the substantive due process claim
in this case. Kendall failed to timely include arguments on this point in his briefing to the
Utah Court of Appeals. See City Defendants’ Appellee Br., at 28, n.3. This Court’s Order
on Supplemental Briefing makes clear that supplemental briefing may not be used to
remedy deficiencies in prior briefing. Suppl. Briefing Order (“[T]his order shall not be
construed to excuse compliance with otherwise-applicable principles or rules of appellate
review, (e.g. preservation in the trial court).”) Regardless, Kendall’s assertion that a
heightened standard of review applies is incorrect. As set forth in a recent decision by this
Court, a rational basis standard of review applies in a case like this where no claim is
abrogated. See City Defendants’ Appellee Br. at 28 citing Tindley, 2005 UT 30, ¶ 29.
9

in the legislature viewing it as within the police power of the sovereign, in
the interest of maintaining the peace and good order of society, to provide
this measure of protection to that class of officers who are willing to
undertake that hazardous responsibility.
Zamora, 635 P.2d at 80 (footnotes omitted).
This unique role of a police officer has not changed and there is nothing to indicate
that officers are subject to fewer frivolous actions now than they were sixty-five years ago.
Indeed, the proliferation in litigation nationwide suggests the opposite. Indeed, this case
is a classic example of the type of overzealous litigation that can result. Kendall has filed
a smorgasbord of state law claims against five different officers and the City for the actions
of those officers. As demonstrated by the motions currently on file with the United States
District Court, most (if not all) of those claims are precluded and are also duplicative of
Kendall’s federal and state constitutional claims. The City Attorney’s Office has spent
time preparing motions to dispose of those claims, when a quick review of the law
demonstrates these claims fall within the parameters of the Governmental Immunity Act
of Utah and are excluded by the public duty doctrine. Requiring a bond serves the purpose
of requiring a plaintiff and their attorney to appropriately research claims before bringing
them and ensures the party defending against such claims is able to collect, at least in part,
the attorneys’ fees and costs they are entitled to receive by statute when they prevail on
such claims.14

14

Notably, the United States District Court recently entered judgment for the City
Defendants on all Kendall’s federal law claims. This will be dispositive of most, if not all,
Kendall’s state law claims. See Dkt. 74, Kendall v. Olsen et. al., United States District
Court for the District of Utah, Case No. 2:15-cv-00862-RJS.
10

Kendall argues he has experienced delay and expense in this matter as a result of
the bond and undertaking statutes. Claimed delay and expense do not show the statutes are
no longer sound because of changing conditions. Moreover, any delay or additional
expense Kendall experienced in this matter was a direct result of Kendall's decision to
challenge the constitutionality of the bond and undertaking statutes in a separate action,
rather than simply pursuing his claims against the City Defendants.

Similarly, it is

incorrect to claim that the statute results in gross injustices because claims are dismissed
without being heard on the merits. When claims are dismissed for a failure to file a
necessary bond or undertaking they are dismissed without prejudice. 15 The plaintiff is free
to re-file the claim with the necessary bond or undertaking.
CONCLUSION

The Court should decline to hear this appeal because the issue is moot and Kendall
does not have standing to challenge the statutes at issue. Moreover, the statutes do riot
violate constitutional rights for the reasons set forth in the City Defendants' brief and the
Court should not depart from the conclusion it reached in Zamora that the bond statute is
constitutional on its face.
DATED this 2Pt day of February, 2017.

8~
Attorney. for Defendants/Appellees
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See, e.g., Rippstein v. City of Provo, 929 'F.2d 576, 578 (lOth Cir. ·1991) (''the
appropriate remedy for failure to make a tiiiiely filing of an undertaking under section 6330-19 is dismissal Without prejudice."); Mglej v. Garfield County, No.2: 13-CV-713, 2014
WL 2967605, at *2 (D. Utah July 1, 2014) (stating "Utah case law is clear that undertakings
and bonds must be filed contemporaneously with the filing of the· complaint" and that
"failure to post an undertaking and bond necessitates dismissal without prejl.1dice").
11
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